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COMMENT ON SECRECY AND THE SUPREME COURT
J. WOODFoRD HOWARD, JR.*

Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants ....
Louis D. Brandeist

s secrecy in the Supreme Court compatible with American democratic traditions? The authors are to be commended for airing this
part of the perennial debate over the role of the Supreme Court in
the American polity. Hedging neither their premise that the high
court is a policy maker, nor their commitment to democratic norms,
they champion the principle-albeit without recommending an implementing procedure-of open decisions, openly arrived at. While I
share similar assumptions about the political functions of the nation's highest court, and agree that the adversary process leaves much
to be desired as a mode of informing appellate judges and holding
them to account, I remain unpersuaded by the basic argument that,
on balance, the disadvantages of secrecy outweigh the advantages in
Supreme Court decision making.'
The historical, comparative, and symbolic arguments can be disposed of briefly. Whatever the motives of John Marshall in establishing the custom of collective decisions, the seriatim practices of
courts of common law have little relevance to the public law tribunal
the Supreme Court has become. Great issues of public policy are
scarcely susceptible of resolution by shooting from the hip. Appellate
practices in other nations also are not dispositive of the issue in the
United States. Though these comparisons are healthy reminders of
the many roads to truth, few if any of the tribunals that deliberate
openly perform the pervasive and delicate functions in their societies
that the Supreme Court does in ours. Judicial review in most of these
countries is still aborning. Nor has open decision making invariably
* Professor of Political Science, The Johns Hopkins University. A.B., Duke University, 1952; Ph.D., Princeton University, 1959.
t OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (paper ed. 1967).
1. See Howard, Adjudication Considered as a Process of Conflict Resolution: A
Variation on Separationof Powers, 18 J. Pun. L. 339 (1969).
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freed these tribunals from suspicion of holding secret caucuses. Swiss
judges, for instance, have been rumored to hold private pow wows before deciding big cases.
Symbolically, though the work of Murray Edelman gives one
pause, the argument that secrecy is necessary to maintain the mystique
and therefore the power of the high court is a strawman easily overkilled.2 For the argument is basically a Platonic lie at war with both
the republican and rationalist traditions of American jurisprudence,
and one little substantiated in empirical literature. If Dr. Gallup is to
be believed, the mass public neither knows nor seems to care about
specific Supreme Court decisions beyond whose ox gets gored. The
symbolic issue of secrecy, like the larger debate over the democratic
character of judicial review, may well be a courtwatcher's problem.8
As Karl Llewellyn suggests, "one can write some rather appealing
music on such themes" as democracy and secrecy. But the basis of secret
deliberations in the Supreme Court is entirely practical and should be
judged accordingly. 4 Does secrecy during and after decision aid or
impair the functions of the Court in the American government? It
must be conceded that we all are groping in the dark in assessing the
practice pragmatically. Systematic empirical proofs are lacking to
measure the effects of alternative procedures one way or another. The
problem, however, requires more than lumping the Court with other
legislative systems and demanding the abolition of secrecy. Even the
most popularly responsible of our political institutions have never
been able to live up to that standard under all circumstances. For
judges as for other policy makers it is necessary to weigh real needs
and dangers, mindful of the distinctive political tasks that the Supreme
Court performs in our governmental scheme.
Apart from tradition, secret deliberations in the Court are said
to be functionally necessary to prevent leaks, promote frank discussion, and secure judicial independence. In my view, these defenses are
neither "ill-founded" nor based on conditions that have "ceased to
exist." Neither do they exhaust the subject. Llewellyn is probably right
2. M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).
3. See Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme
Court: A PreliminaryMapping of Some Prerequisitesfor Court Legitimation of Regime
Changes, 2 LAw & Soc'y REv. 357 (1968). See also S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIOE, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 135-48 (1971).
4. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 325
(1960).
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that secrecy arose as a corollary of postponement in order to avoid
misapprehension, speculation, and reprisals. Judicial history does not
warrant conclusions that these dangers have disappeared. On the contrary, one of the cited episodes-Dred Scott v. Sandford 5-well illustrates how premature disclosure may activate public wounds. One
need only imagine the financial windfalls of leaks in the Penn Central
merger, not to mention the political uproar surrounding open deliberations in Brown v. Board of Education,6 to grasp that these dangers
are genuine. A concomitant of taking cases under advisement is secrecy
until decision is rendered. The more potent the case politically, the
more compelling may be the need for silence.
Preventing leaks, moreover, is only part of the larger purpose of
encouraging careful deliberation. It should be remembered that holding decisions in the bosom of the Court results less from delay than
from difficulty and demands for collegial reflection. Reflection is the
essence of the appellate function as distinct from the trial judge's
responsibility to make quick judgments. Presumably the Justices have
exhausted the decisions that can be made quickly during initial screening of certiorari petitions. Granted that the Court over the years has
been less instructive about its reasons for granting and denying
certiorari than desirable, the remedy of open decision making may be
too strong a tonic for reasons that cut deeply into the appellate process.
Promoting frank discussion is but one of the reasons for decisional privacy. A much-touted advantage of the adversary system is
prevention of premature judgment. The papers of Justices Murphy
and Burton, which include their notes of frank conference discussions, reveal several instances of persuasion and ripening judgment
under the Court's mantle of privacy. For example, Justice Black
changed his mind and the result in several civil liberties landmarks
such as Martin v. Struthers7 and Colegrove v. Green.8 Justice Douglas
did likewise in Terminiello v. Chicago.9 In a recent television interview, Earl Warren emphasized that the Court managed to reach
unanimity in Brown v. Board of Education because the Justices did
not polarize themselves by taking a vote on the great issue until week
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7. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). For details in these and the following cases see J. HOWARD,
JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1968).
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after week of noncommittal discussion. One wonders whether strongminded jurists could change their positions so readily, or make the
necessary adjustments in collectively bargained language, if compelled
to take their stands in public. Methods suited to free-wheeling legal
exchanges at trial may well be incompatible with deciding appeals
on collegial courts bearing final responsibility.
Another touted advantage of our legal system is incremental legal
growth, case-by-case. 10 The papers of several Justices-e.g., Stone,
Frankfurter, Murphy, and Burton-reflect the vigor of argumentation
inside the Court. Among themselves, as in oral argument, Justices
commonly debated by trimming issues and distinguishing cases, by
proposing dicta and projecting principles onto hypothetical situations,
all customary methods of separating wheat from chaff in the process
of "reasoning by example." In Everson v. Board of Education" for
instance, Justices Frankfurter and Jackson bordered on absolutism
rather than breach the high wall separating church and state, and
Justice Rutledge proposed going the whole route by forbidding state
aid to any private school whatsoever.' 2 When the stakes are so high,
one wonders whether the Justices could so freely expose their tentative conclusions about issues not yet before them. And even if they
could, the gains for adversary process must be weighed against the risk
of cutting too broad a legislative swath. Precisely because courts make
law in pieces rather than whole cloth, Justices have reason not "to
speak out frankly in open court and lay bear their minds" about policy
problems only partially before them.
By like token, it is scarcely "shallow" to suggest that secret deliberations help to insulate the Court from popular pressures while
grappling with pressing public problems. How much insulation is essential, of course, depends on the thickness of judicial hides. But the
recent history of enforcing voting rights and school desegregation in
the South generates little confidence that lifetime tenure with good
behavior is sufficient. United States district court judges, some of whom
buckled under parochial heat, enjoy the same security.
The distinctive political tasks of the Supreme Court, not "robism,"
underlie my basic difficulty with the proposition that the time has
10. Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Incrementalism
or Stare Decisis? 2 LAW IN TRANS. Q. 134 (1965).
11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12. Id.
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come to eliminate secret consultations as a relic of an elitist past. The
Supreme Court is not an ordinary court or legislature; it is a superlegislature serving in a reflective capacity above the fray. Whether it
registers the "sober second thoughts of the community," provides the
"conscience of the country," or merely offers another chance for outsiders and losers at the polls to vindicate their federal rights, it serves
as a more remote authority rendering policy decisions that more popularly responsible officials lack the power or will to make. So long as
we accept those functions, and the authors appear to, procedures that
insure remoteness and the capacity to reflect are part of the price.
Many Justices, discomfitted by the personal isolation of the job,
have made Charles deGaulle's discovery that the general dines alone.
The political imperatives of "massing" the Court, as William Howard
Taft called the urge for unanimity, also should not be underestimated.
Richard E. Neustadt has written that the first prerequisite of presiden13
tial power is that presidential commands be clear and unambiguous.
The same applies to the judiciary. However much seriatim opinions
may appeal to the democratic spirit, effective leadership of a complex
legal bureaucracy via case law hinges upon a clear voice from the top.
Once that is admitted, private bargaining follows. Again, Brown v.
Board of Education is a prime exhibit. Had positions stiffened at the
point when Chief Justice Warren took the helm, the Court apparently
would have commanded the country to dismantle school segregation
by a 6-3 division-hardly a prescription for positive leadership in a
great leap forward of social change. 14
Risks obviously run when ultimate power is secret. It is hard to
prove that secrecy is necessary for the power to be ultimate. Against
the values promoted by privacy can be set the dangers of corruption
and irrationality unexposed, of independent decision making unchecked by adversary process, even evidence of the "risky-shift" hypothesis that groups take greater risks than individualsY' Against the
dangers of leaks also may be set known instances when public exposure,
or the threat of it, stifled potential breaches of the proprieties by
Justices or, as in William Schneiderman's case, against them.' 6 But
considered in its entirety, the evidence is thin that the Court has long
13.
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failed to be responsive to dominant law-making coalitions, thinner
still that secret deliberations are responsible for its lapses. 17 Secrecy is
perhaps more symptom than cause of the adversary system's inadequacies. So long as the Supreme Court's governmental functions are
to remain, the needs and dangers justifying secret consultation are
real enough to counsel caution before discarding the practice cavalierly
on grounds of incompatibility with democratic theory. "Judicial review," Edward S. Corwin once observed, "represents an attempt by
the American Democracy to cover its bet."' 8 So it is with the methods
that the Supreme Court employs to perform that task.
In the main I have concentrated on the easier target of secret
deliberations. The case for secrecy after decision is less persuasive,
as Justice Frankfurter noted, and appropriate standards are more
treacherous. A professional student of the judiciary like myself is
hardly an unbiased observer concerning the proper time to expose the
Supreme Court's inner workings. But I take this opportunity to raise
briefly the issue of subsequent revelation, because the subject is in
serious need of standards to prevent some lamentable practices such
as destruction of records that belong to the public, scrambling for
monopolistic control of papers on the part of archivists and scholars,
and leaks via judicial papers that intrude on the Court's current
operations.
Judicial biographies of varying degrees of frankness and quality
have been written for generations. The Supreme Court survived.
Indeed, most of our knowledge about how the Justices operate is
largely a product of these works.' 9 Certain Justices are nervous, nevertheless, about the potential invasion of their privacy to the point of
burning or threatening to burn their papers. My position is that the
privilege of secrecy imposes on them a counterpart responsibility of
ultimate exposure to the bar of history. Therefore, the judicial papers
of deceased Justices should be left to the public, preferably in public
depositories like the Library of Congress, under reasonable restrictions as to laws of libel, state secrets, and passage of time to prevent
intrusion in the Court's current functioning. Note that the gravamen
is not upholding the "upper court myth," much less preventing per17. Dabl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279 (1957).
18. Convin, Book Review, 56 HARv. L. REv.487 (1942).
19. See Howard, Judicial Biography and the Behavioral Persuasion, 65 Amt.
POL. Sci. Rav. 704 (1971).
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sonal embarrassments, so much as forestalling intrusion in current
litigation. Scholars have no more business getting in the way of other
people's lawsuits than they have in perpetuating myths. History, after
all, can wait.20
Reasonable men will differ about how much delay is necessary
for this purpose. Justice Frankfurter imposed a sixteen-year restriction on publication of his papers. The subject is not free from difficulty, because even the standard diplomatic delay of 25 years would
not prevent papers from occasionally flushing out the positions of
Justices with long tenure on unsettled legal questions. Revelation in
such instances would be unfair to the judges, who may have altered
their views in the interim, and to the litigants, who may read cases but
not biographies. While writing a biography of Justice Murphy, I
faced that dilemma in several important cases before the courts and
opted to withhold the information until a later day. As matters stand,
the disposition and use of judicial papers depend entirely on such
personal judgments. Far better that the Supreme Court and its scholarly
constituency develop common standards to accommodate the claims
of Clio and Themis.
20. For other views see, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS Vili-iX (1957); A. T. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO
WARREN 200-13 (1958); Peltason, Supreme Court Biography and the Study of Public
Law, in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 215 (G. Dietze ed. 1964); Ulmer,
Bricolage and Assorted Thoughts on Working in the Papers of Supreme Court Justices,
to be published in the Journal of Politics; Dunham, Book Review, 24 U. CHI. L. REV.
794, 797 (1957).

